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BLAKETTA ALLEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 890408

-vsPRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL
District Judge

H. RALPH KLEMM
349 South 200 East, Suite 560
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 328-2206
Attorney for Appellant
HANSEN, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
T.J. Tsakalos
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2970
Telephone: 363-7611
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Attorneys for Respondent
Gte'k, Supreme Coust, U*ah

T. J. TSAKALOS #3289
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P. 0. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
(801)363-7611
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BLAKETTA ALLEN,
Plaintiff,
v.

']
i JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
;
]

PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,

f ?eyoj>

i Civil No.: C88-2411
\

Judge Noel

Defendant.
The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment coming
before the Court for oral argument on August 4, 1989, the Court
having read the briefs submitted by the parties and having
considered the arguments of counsel, the Court finds that under
the facts of this case that the Motion for Summary Judgment of
the defendant is proper as set forth in the arguments of
defendant, and there being no just reason for delay of entry of
this final order, and there being no genuine issue of any
material fact,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and
plaintiff's claims against defendant are dismissed with
^

prejudice.
SO ORDERED this

""Hay of

/^kfk&O,

1989.

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed postage
prepaid, on the *7 day of August, 1989, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing, to the following:
H. Ralph Klemm
500 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

-rnLufhL Ua/jh*

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BLAKETTA ALLEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 890408

-vsPRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL
District Judge

H. RALPH KLEMM
349 South 200 East, Suite 560
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 328-2206
Attorney for Appellant
HANSEN, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
T.J. Tsakalos
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2970
Telephone: 363-7611
Attorneys for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

5

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I:

LACK OF ADHERENCE TO PROPER
PROCEDURAL MATTERS REQUIRE THE
REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S
DECISION.

POINT NO. II

THE BASIS FOR THE DISTRICT
COURT'S RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
REMAINS UNCLEAR AT THIS TIME.

POINT NO. Ill

THE ADHESION CONTRACT THEORY IS
A VALID AND VIABLE CONCEPT OF LAW
IN THE STATE OF UTAH.

10

THE PROVISIONS OF THE ALLEN
HOMEOWNER POLICY RELATING TO THE
HOUSEHOLD EXCLUSION ARE HOPELESSLY
AMBIGUOUS

15

THE APPELLATE COURT SHOULD APPLY
THE CONCEPTS OF THE WAGNER CASE TO
THE MATTER ON APPEAL

18

POINT NO. IV:

POINT NO. V:

CONCLUSION

21

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
e
Accord Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co. v. Wiscomb,
643 P.2d 441 (Wash. 1982)

. 11,

Darner Motor Sales, Inc., v. Universal Underwriters
Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 682 P.2d 388, 395 (1984)
(en banc)
. . . . . . . . .

12

Estep v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.
703 P.2d 882, 887 (N.M. 1985)

13

Farmer's Insurance Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (1985)

11,

General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Martinez, 668 P.2d 498
(1983)

10,

Hawaiian Insurance & Guarantee Co. v. Brooks, 686 P.2d 23
(Hawaii 1984)

14

Keeten, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy
Provisions, 83, Harv. L. Rev. 961, 967 (1970)

15

Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 114 Utah Adv. Rep. 26
(1989)
2d

8

State Farm's Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Mastbaum, 748 P. 2d 1042 (Utah 1987)

11,

Sturla, Inc., v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.,
67 Haw. 203, 209-10, 684 P.2d 960, 964 (1984)

15

Thompson v, Ford Motor Co., 14 Utah 2d. 334, 384, P.2d 109
Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Royle, 656 P.2d 820, 824
(Mont. 1983)

8

11,

Wagner v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 125 Utah Adv.
Rep. 62;
P.2d
, (1990)

2, 7,
12, 18,
19, 20

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BLAKETTA ALLEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 890408

-vsPRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Jurisdiction
provisions of
which

Utah

provides

is

Code

that

conferred

Annotated,

the

Utah

on
1953,

Supreme

the

court

by

Title 78-2-2(3)(i),

Court

has

appellant

jurisdiction over orders, judgments, and decrees of any
record over

which the

Court of

the

Appeals does

court of

not have original

appellate jurisdiction.
Plaintiff
against her

brought

own insurance

this

Declaratory

company to

Judgment

action

invalidate an endorsement

attached to her homeowner policy that excluded liability coverage
for some

of the

named insureds.

Contract

Theory

as

a

legal

She

basis

1

relied upon the Adhesion
for

invalidation

of

the

endorsement9

and

her

Complaint

alleged facts that support her

theory.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues presented on this appeal are as follows:
1.

Should

lower court's

the

Supreme

Court

summarily

reverse the

decision for manifest error in failing to open and

publish the depositions upon which it relied for

a factual basis

for its Judgment of Dismissal?
2.
District

Should the Supreme Court send the case back to the

Court

for

a

clarification

of

the

grounds

for its

decision to grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment?
3.
contracts?
establish

Does

the

State

of

Utah

recognize

adhesion

If so, was there sufficient evidence in the record to
that

the

Allen

insurance

policy

was

an

adhesion

contract?
4.
relating

to

Were the provisions of
the

household

the Allen

exclusion

homeowner policy

endorsement

clear

and

unambiguous?
5.

Should the Supreme Court apply the

principles laid

down in Wagner v. Farmer's Insurance Company to the facts of this
action?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff filed the declaratory judgment action against
her own insurance company to invalidate the household endorsement
in her homeowner policy that excluded liability coverage
Allen family.

for the

She relied upon the Adhesion Contract Theory as a
2

legal basis for the

invalidation

of

the

endorsement,

and her

Complaint sought relief under that theory.
The

case

arose

against Mrs. Allen to

when

a

recover personal

by her minor child, Ryan Allen.
that Ryan

was

seriously

negligently and

negligence

and

injured

and

carelessly caused

cited

the

injury damages sustained

The negligence Complaint alleges
burned

when

Mrs. Allen

boiling water to fall on him.

Prudential Insurance Company denied
accident

action was filed

liability

household

coverage

for the

endorsement attached to its

policy as a reason for that denial.
Plaintiff took the
selling

agent

who

Aliens bought the
depositions of

deposition

represented
homeowner

the

of

Russell

Mower, the

insurance company when the

policy.

The

defendant

took the

Mr. and Mrs. Allen and then immediately filed its

Motion for Summary Judgment.
The

District

Court

of

Salt

Lake

County,

with the

Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding, granted defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment and entered a Judgment of Dismissal
the defendant.

The

trial court

in favor of

thereby upheld the validity of

the household exclusion endorsement attached to the policy.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1981, Ashley and Blaketta Allen
Policy No.

51-6H391346 from

purchased Homeowner

Prudential Insurance

Company.

Mr.

Russell Mower was the selling agent for the company. (Answer par.
4; A.Allen depo., pp. 9-10)

3

Mr.

Mower

came

to

the

discuss the homeowner insurance.
house at

Although Mrs. Allen

was in the

the time of the meeting, she did not participate in the

actual discussion
and her

Allen home on May 6, 1981 to

about the

husband.

homeowner policy

She told Mr. Mower that she didn't understand

insurance matters and that she would have to
agent to do what was right for the family.

leave it

up to the

But she understood at

that time that she and her children would
the policy.

between the agent

also be

insured under

(B.Allen depo. pp.12-18)

When Mr.

Mower visited

with Mr.

Allen at his home on

May 6, 1981, it was the first time Allen had
an insurance

agent to

buy insurance for himself.

the homeowner policy in question,
agent's recommendations.

Mr.

him the

family.

cover

intended

benefits when he bought
were covered

Allen

down with

In purchasing

just

followed the

He trusted the agent completely, and he

relied on the agent to give
He

ever sat

to

his

the policy,

under the policy.

coverage he
children

and he

needed for his
with insurance

always thought they

(A.Allen depo. pp. 22-24 and 74-

76)
The insurance
that he

did not

testified

during

his deposition

explain the household exclusion attached to the

Allen policy

to the

merely

them

told

agent

buyers when
that

they

he sold

should

them the

policy.

He

read the policy when they

received it. (Mower depo. pp. 17,22)
About a year after they bought
purchased a trampoline for the family.
4

the policy,

the Aliens

Mr. Allen then called Mr.

Mower and asked him
that anyone

to increase

his coverage

he wanted

to make

children

for

such

On April
seriously injured

18,

agent the

the

intended to

and

he

cover his

thought he had such

Aliens1

minor

son

Ryan was

pan of hot water fell on him. (B.Allen

par. 12)

following day

about the trampoline

(A.Allen depo. pp. 28,75-76)

1984

when a

depo., p. 5; Answer,

He

injuries,

coverage under the policy.

He

sure he had full coverage under the

policy to cover such an eventuality.
own

make sure

who got hurt on the trampoline would be covered.

told the agent that he was really concerned
and that

and to

Mr.

and told

Allen called

him about

the insurance

the accident.

Mr.

Mower then informed him that there was an exclusion in the policy
and that

Prudential wouldn't

the Allen family.
advised

about

This was

the

pay for any injuries to members of
the first

endorsement

in

time that

the

Mr. Allen was

policy. (A.Allen depo.

pp.32-33)
When a negligence action
to recover

damages for

was filed

against Mrs. Allen

the injuries suffered by Ryan Allen, the

insurance company declined to defend the case for
that the

her on grounds

"household endorsement" excluded liability coverage for

family members.

This action was then initiated to invalidate the

endorsement.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A brief

summary of the Arguments made by the plaintiff

in support of her position in this action is as follows:

5

POINT NO. I:
failed

to

publish

Procedural

the

depositions

factual basis for its decision.
to

a

summary

Error.

reversal

of

The

District Court

upon which it relied for a

This may

entitle the plaintiff

the case for manifest error because

there was no factual basis for the granting of that Motion.
POINT NO.
District Court

II:

Ground

based its

for

Decision.

decision on

defendant in its Memorandum

Because the

the arguments made by the

of Authorities,

it is

difficult to

determine the basis for the District Court's ruling.
appears to be multiple grounds
based its

ruling, the

on

which

District Court

Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil

the

Since there

court

could have

should have complied with

Procedure by

issuing a brief

statement of the ground for its decision•
POINT

NO.

Ill:

Adhesion Contract Theory.

The Utah

Supreme Court has recognized

the concept

and

Theory has been expanded to include

the

Adhesion

Contract

automobile insurance.
further to

The

include homeowner

ruled that the Adhesion
Utah,

then

its

ruling

reversed.

If

the

evidence in

the record

court

court

Theory

legally
ruled

to show

was an adhesion contract, the

should

expand

insurance policies.

Contract
was

of adhesion contracts,

is

not

erroneous

that

there

that concept
If the court
applicable in
and

should be

was insufficient

that the Allen insurance policy

ruling

is

equally

erroneous and

should be reversed.
POINT
reconcile the

NO.

IV:

Contract

household endorsement
6

Ambiguity.
with the

In attempt to

other portions of

the homeowner

insurance policy

reveals that the Allen homeowner

policy is hopelessly ambiguous on that point.
that

the

provisions

of

the

If the court ruled

household exclusion are clear and

unambiguous, then the court erred in its rulingjand it

should be

reversed.
POINT

NO.

V:

New

Concepts.

The case of Wagner v.

Farmer's Insurance Exchange gives a new look to the Adhesion
Contract Theory, and the guidelines laid down in

that case should

be reviewed and followed by the court in resolving this action.
A R G U M E N T
POINT NO.

I

LACK OF ADHERENCE TO PROPER PROCEDURAL MATTERS
REQUIRES* THE REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
Appellant

feels

that

an

important procedural matter

should be brought to the attention of the Appellate Court.

When

defendant

also

filed

its

submitted a Motion
Blaketta Allen.

to

Motion

for

Publish

the

Summary

Judgment,

Depositions

determining

Ashley and

The second page of that Motion included an Order

providing that the depositions be published by the
in

of

it

the

validity

court for use

of plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment.
Both parties filed extensive memoranda relating

to the

Motion for Summary Judgment, and oral argument was allowed by the
court before it ruled
the

court

had

signed

on the
the

Motion. Both
Publication

parties assumed that
Order and that the two

depositions had been published by the court.

7

Reference was made

to the

testimony of these two witnesses in the Briefs and in the

oral argument.
After the Notice of Appeal was filed by
counsel went

to the office of the Third District Court to review

the Record on Appeal

for use

discovered

first

signed

for

the

the

Order

depositions

of

in preparing
time

plaintiff

his Brief.

He then

that the Trial Judge had never

provided

plaintiff

for

and

first

the

publication

her husband.

realize

that

of the

Only then did
his

client had

file a Motion for Summary Reversal for Manifest Error

because there was
Motion.

that

the

counsel for the
grounds to

the plaintiff,

no

Counsel has

factual

basis

for

previously filed

the

granting

of the

a Motion with this court

for suspension of court rules to enable him to bring a Motion for
Summary

Reversal

on

those

grounds.

This

Motion was denied

pending the filing of Briefs, and the court may wish

to consider

the serious procedural error that was made by the District Court.
This

court

Court's decision

has

had

and send

as a

factual basis

open the

Sorenson
P2d.

Research

reverse

the Trial

Co.,

sealed depositions that

for Entry of Summary Judgment.

Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 14 Utah 2d.
v.

to

the case back for further proceedings

when the lower court failed to
it used

occasion

114

Utah

334, 384,
Adv.

P2d 109; Lowe

Rep.

•
POINT NO. II
THE BASIS FOR THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING
ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
REMAINS UNCLEAR AT THIS TIME.
8

See

26

(1989)

Judgment

When the Trial Judge

granted

he

was

stated

that

he

the

Motion

basing

his

for Summary

decision on the

arguments made by the defendant in its Memorandum of Authorities.
The Judgment

of Dismissal

Trial Court "finds that
Motion for

entered by the court recites that the

under the

Summary Judgment

facts of

of the

this case

Defendant is

forth in the arguments of the defendant."

that the

proper as set

No additional

oral or

written statement was made by the court to explain the ground for
its decision.
A careful review of defendant's first
in

support

of

its

Motion

for

defendant initially based its
that

the

public

household

policy.

Summary

Motion

endorsement

There

is

in

no

Memorandum filed

Judgment reveals that

solely

upon

question

discussion

the argument

does not violate

about

the Adhesion

Contract Theory in that Memorandum.
Defendant's
plaintiff's

argument

asserting that

Reply
about

the

plaintiff has

that the insurance policy
issued.

Brief

In the

attempts

Adhesion

provided no

was an

to

Contract

respond

to

Theory

by

evidence to establish

adhesion contract

when it was

alternative, assuming that the insurance policy

was found to be an adhesion contract, defendant argued that the
Contract Theory does not apply to homeowner policies and that the
household endorsement in question was not ambiguous.
Because of

the posture

the defendant in support of its
is

difficult

to

determine

of the
Motion for

the
9

two Memoranda filed by
Summary Judgment, it

basis for the District Court's

ruling.

It is hard to resolve whether the Trial Court recognized

or rejected the Adhesion Contract Theory.

Since there appears to

be multiple grounds on

could

ruling,

it

would

which

have

the

been

court

have

based its

helpful if the District Court had

complied with Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure by

issuing a brief written statement of the ground for its decision.
Nevertheless, plaintiff will

attempt

to

discuss

the pertinent

matters raised in defendant's two supporting Briefs.

POINT NO. Ill
THE ADHESION CONTRACT THEORY IS A VALID AND VIABLE
CONCEPT OF LAW IN THE STATE OF UTAH.
In her Complaint, Mrs. Allen alleges that the household
exclusion contained
enforceable

in her

because

the

homeowner's insurance
policy

relies primarily on this theory as

is

policy is not

an Adhesion Contract.

a basis

for the

She

issuance of

the Declaratory Judgment that she seeks from the court.
The Utah
Adhesion

Supreme Court

Contracts.

Martinez, 668

In

P.2d 498

General

(1983) the

has recognized
Motors

the requirements

Acceptance

Corp. v.

court recognized that credit

life and accident insurance are generally
Some of

the concept of

contracts of adhesion.

mandated by this concept are discussed

by the court as follows:
Credit life and accident insurance are generally
contracts of adhesion which are not negotiated at arms
length and which usually contain various provisions for
protection of the interests of the insurance company.
Because those who purchase such policies rely on the
assumption that they are covered by the insurance they
buy, the Legislature, in the interest of fair dealing,
10

has deemed it mandatory that an insured be given a copy
of the policy so that he can take whatever action is
appropriate to protect his interest and be assured that
the coverage which he thinks he has contracted for is
actually provided.
It is not consonant with our
statute for an insurance company to accept premiums and
then deny liability on the ground of an exclusion of
which the insured was not aware because the insurance
company had never informed him of the exclusion or
given him the means to ascertain its existence*
The Utah Supreme Court
Theory

expanded the

Adhesion Contract

to automobile insurance in the case of Farmer's Insurance

Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (1985).
previous holding

in

the

Martinez

After discussing its

case,

the

court

stated as

follows:
Although Martinez involved a statute requiring delivery
of a credit life and disability policy to the insured,
the public policy expressed is equally applicable to
automobile insurance policies.
Like credit life and
disability insurance, automobile insurance is generally
sold through adhesion contracts that are not negotiated
at arm's length.
Purchasers commonly rely on the
assumption that they are fully covered by the insurance
that they buy. Because of this, public policy requires
that persons purchasing such policies are entitled to
be informed, in writing of the essential terms of
insurance contracts, especially exclusionary terms.
Martinez, 668 P.2d at 501.
We therefore hold that where the insurer fails to
disclose material exclusions in an automobile insurance
policy and the purchaser is not informed of them in
writing, those
exclusions are
invalid.
Without
disclosure, the household exclusion clause fails to
"honor the reasonable expectations" of the purchaser,
rendering the exclusion clause invalid as to the entire
policy limits. Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Royle,
Mont., 656 P.2d 820, 824 (1983); Accord Mutual of
Enumclaw v. Wiscomb, 97 Wash. 2d 203, 543 P.2d 441
(1982).
In

State

Mastbaum. 748 P.2d

Farm's
1042

Mutual

(Utah

Automobile

1987)
11

Justice

Insurance Co. v.
Durham dissented

because the

majority believed

had not been properly
dissenting

opinion

that the

raised in
that

adhesion contract claim

the appeal.

other

Utah

cases

She

noted in her

had recognized the

adhesive nature of insurance policies because purchasers commonly
rely

on

the

assumption

that

they

are

fully

covered by the

insurance they buy.
In the recent
Exchange,

125

Utah

Adv.

Utah Court of Appeals
generally
should

sold

give

under

some

of

to

Wagner

v.

Rep. 62;

recognized

through

effect

injured party,

case

that

adhesion
the

Farmer's Insurance

P.2d

, (1990), the

automobile

insurance is

contracts and that the courts

"reasonable

expectations"

of the

even though that concept may be quite troublesome

circumstances.

The

language

of

the

court

is

noteworthy, and it reads as follows:
We recognize that "automobile insurance is generally
sold through adhesion contracts that are not negotiated
at arm's length, and that "[p]urchasers commonly rely
on the assumption that they are fully covered by the
insurance that they buy." Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call,
712 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah 1985); see also Darner Motor
Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140
Ariz. 383, 682 P.2d 388, 395 (1984) (en banc). Where
possible, we attempt to give effect to the reasonable
expectations of the insured party.
The recognition by Utah courts that
are

commonly

jurisdictions.

adhesion

contracts

is

In Mutual of Enumclaw

also

insurance policies
supported

Insurance Co.

by other

v. Wiscomb,

643 P.2d 441 (Wash. 1982) the Washington Supreme Court said:
. . . . to say there is freedom of contract in these
cases is to ignore reality.
A number of insurers in
this state will not sell a policy without the family or
household exclusion.
*

*

12

*

Such a state of affairs undercuts any assertion that
the parties are free to contract for.this coverage.
The contract analysis might be persuasive if this were
a coverage that one could choose to purchase or not
purchase from each insurer.
The present arrangement,
however, is a take it or leave it proposition.
The New Mexico Supreme Court said:
The discussion in Wiscomb of the "take it or leave it"
nature of obtaining automobile liability coverage, and
the effect of the policy's exclusion on third parties
who are or may
be
ignorant
of
the insurance
arrangements and unable or incompetent to contract for
coverage for themselves, illustrates the fragility of
any assertion that the terms of this or similar
insurance policies truly are the product of conscious
bargaining between the parties. The argument might be
more credibly made were there evidence that insureds
had been, or traditionally are, offered the choice of
including or excluding coverage for family members.
There is no such evidence in this record.
Estep v.

State Farm

(N.M. 1985).

Mutual Auto Insurance Co. 703 P.2d 882, 887

See also Transamerica

Insurance Co.

v. Royle, 656

P.2d 820, 824 (Mont. 1983).
The insurance

policy which is the subject of this suit

has the characteristics of
relied
them

completely
with

on

coverage

defendant's agent

the

adhesion

contract.

The Aliens

insurance company's agent to provide

sufficient

did not

the Aliens prior to

an

to

meet

discuss the

their purchase

their

needs.

The

household exclusion with

of the

policy.

The Aliens

were not given the opportunity to review or read the policy until
it arrived in the mail some
offered no

choice on

two months

later.

The Aliens were

whether to include or exclude coverage for

family members in the policy, and there was no bargaining between
the parties

regarding that coverage.
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When the adhesion contract

doctrine

is

determine

applied

the

meaning

reasonably €>xpect.
clearly

to

insurance
of

the

the

the

courts must

contract that the insured would

The evidence

establishes

policies,

in

adhesive

the

two

nature

Allen depositions

of

their

homeowner

policy*
Because of
liability

the nature,

provisions

of

purpose and

automobile

and

similarity of the

homeowner

policies, the above cases apply equally as well
variety.

insurance

to the homeowner

The sales characteristics are the same in both types of

policies, and the lack

of

bargaining

opportunities

appears in

both instances.
One

of

the

major

arguments

counsel concerned the plaintiff's

made by the defendant's

failure to

read her insurance

policy once it was mailed to the family by the insurance company.
There is ample authority to establish that the
Theory is

viable even

insurance policy.
where

Justice

failure

to

read

limitations

may

though the insured has failed to read the

See State

Durham
the
not

Adhesion Contract

points

Farm
out

policy's
be

v.

Mastbaum,

that

"an

insureds complete

provisions,

determinative

of

expectations unless the insurer can demonstrate
to

read

was

unreasonable."

Guarantee Co. v. Brooks, 686

See
P.2d

also
23

Supra, p.1047,

exclusions,
his

reasonable

that the failure

Hawaiian

(Hawaii

or

1984)

Insurance &
where the

Supreme Court of Hawaii, stated as follows:
We are guided in the task by the broad principle
that "[t]he objectively reasonable expectations of
[policyholders] and intended beneficiaries regarding
the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even
14

though painstaking study of the policy provisions would
have negated those expectations."
Keeten, Insurance
Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions, 83,
Harv. L. Rev. 961, 967 )1970); see also Sturla, Inc. v.
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 67 Haw. 203, 209-10, 684
P.2d 960, 964 (1984).
In
Contract

summary

Theory,

then,

and

Utah

failure

to

necessarily bar recovery by the
ruled

that the

State of

Law

recognizes

read

insured*

Utah does

the

the Adhesion

contract does not

If

the

Trial Court

not recognize the Adhesion

Contract Theory, then its ruling was clearly erroneous and should
be reversed

by the

Appellate Court.

Trial Court ruled that there

was

On the other hand, if the

insufficient

evidence

in the

record to show that the Allen homeowner insurance policy was an
adhesion contract,

the ruling is equally erroneous and should be

corrected on this appeal.
POINT NO. IV
THE PROVISIONS OF THE ALLEN HOMEOWNER
POLICY RELATING TO THE HOUSEHOLD EXCLUSION
ARE HOPELESSLY AMBIGUOUS
It must be remembered

that the

Allen homeowner policy

itself did

not contain or include any reference to the household

exclusion.

The exclusion came in the form of an

was

stapled

attachments.

to

the

policy

The words of

meaning is unclear.

along

the

with

attachment

a

attachment that

number

are

short,

of

other

and the

It says:

Under Coverage - Personal Liability, this policy does not
apply to bodily injury or to any Insured under parts (1) and
(2) of the definition of "Insured."
In

the

bold type we find

upper

right

the words

hand corner of the attachment in

"PERSONAL LIABILITY
15

- SECTION II".

These

words

ought

to

give

meaning and purpose of

this

the reader some guidance as to the
document.

It

can

reasonably be

presumed that the attachment refers to Section II.
After a

diligent search of the body of the policy, the

reader finds Section II, which is labeled "COVERAGES",
HO-3.

The policy

LIABILITY."

immediately discusses

Unfortunately, no

Coverages Section.

next

"COVERAGE E - PERSONAL

definitions are

included in the

On the next page (4 HO-3) the policy includes

the exclusions to Coverage
The

on page 3

category

E, none

of which

are relevant here.

is entitled "SUPPLEMENTARY COVERAGES," which

also makes no reference to any definitions.
On the
entitled

bottom

"ADDITIONAL

of

page

DEFINITIONS",

4

HO-3,
where

we
the

find

a section

average

policy

reader might hope for some guidance to unlock this mystery.
hopes

are

first

lifted

significantly when he reads the words,

"The following definitions apply only to
Section II

of this

His

policy."

coverage afforded under

Turning to paragraphs 1 and 2, he

finds the definitions for "bodily injury" and "medical expenses."
Any attempt

to reconcile

the attachment is futile.

those definitions with the language of
One

must

look

further

for

help in

determining the meaning of the endorsement.
Still

referring

to

Section

II,

as

stated

attachment, the reader goes to Part A of the policy,

finds

a

SECTION II."

heading

entitled

Unfortunately,

"CONDITIONS

the

page 3, and

finds the "GENERAL CONDITIONS" that govern the policy.
he

in

APPLICABLE

On Page 4
ONLY TO

that part gives no guidance to the
16

language of the meaning

of the

attachment because

there are no

definitions included in that section.
Then the

reader must

turn to

the other

parts of the

policy for guidance in determining the meaning of the attachment.
Under paragraph

8 of

the General

Conditions of the Policy, the

reader finally finds the meaning of the word "insured" as used in
the policy.

Only

there does

he learn

that the word "insured"

includes the named insured and the residents of his household.
The
misleading

language

that

of

only

the

law-trained

determine what it refers to.
never

received

legal

they are not

even

endorsement"

in

attachment

so

vague

and

people would ever be able to

The plaintiff and her

training.

husband have

Their depositions reveal that

college-trained.
question

is

sorely

The
lacks

so-called "household
the

clarity needed to

advise the plaintiff of the broad exclusion that

was intended by

the insurance company.
Why didn't
to the policy
policy don't
would

have

that

the company
the

apply to

personal
the named

accomplished

understandable way.

simply state in the attachment

its

liability

provisions

insured and

purpose

in

a

his family?
fair,

of the
This

simple and

Plaintiff suggests that perhaps Prudential

Insurance Company didn't want its insured to fully understand the
provisions of

the policy.

If the

knew how little coverage he actually

average insurance customer
receives for

his insurance

dollar, he would be much more selective in choosing the insurance
he buys.
17

In any event, the "household endorsement",
plaintiff's insurance

policy is

cannot be expected to grasp its
the policy.

It

attached to

so ambiguous that the layperson
meaning or

merely creates

purpose from reading

a labyrinth

lays down a fog of confusion for those

of uncertainty and

who try

to translate its

provisions into a meaningful a document.
If the

court held that the provisions of the household

exclusion were clear and unambiguous, then the court erred in its
ruling and

should be

reversed.

The case should be sent back to

the District Court for a factual determination of the question of
whether or not the policy provisions were ambiguous.

POINT NO. V
THE APPELLATE COURT SHOULD APPLY THE
CONCEPTS OF THE WAGNER CASE
TO THE MATTER ON APPEAL
The Adhesion

Contract Doctrine

to as the "reasonable expectations"
cases because

emphasis is

might reasonably
Utah case

expect the

given to

has also been referred

theory

in

the

more recent

what the buyer of insurance

policy to

cover.

The most recent

to address this theory is Wagner v. Farmer's Insurance

Exchange, 125 Utah Adv. Rep. 62;

P2d.

(Utah App. 1990).

In Wagner, plaintiff's decedent was killed in a one car accident,
and sought

a

declaratory

uninsured motorist
limits.

judgment

benefits in

that

excess of

The issue before the Utah Court

the provisions

of the

insurance policy
18

she

was

entitled to

the minimum statutory
of Appeals

was whether

which excluded coverage

should be voided as

against

reasonably expected

to be

pubic

policy

covered in

because

such a

the insured

situation when he

purchased the policy."
The

court

set

forth

the

plaintiff's

arguments

as

follows:
that the insurance policies are not typical
contracts in which the terms are bargained for by the
parties but are, instead, contracts of adhesion. She
also argues that purchasers commonly expect to be fully
covered by the insurance they buy,
so the insurance
contract should be essentially rewritten to fulfil [the
insured's] reasonable expectation of coverage.
Id. at

63.

The court

recognized at the outset that automobile

insurance is usually sold through contracts of adhesion.

Id. The

court also stated its intention "to give effect to the reasonable
expectations of the insured party" where possible.
The

Wagner

determine whether

court

would

the reasonable

applied in a particular case.

examine

three

factors

to

expectations concept should be

These are as follows:

First, whether the insurer knew or should have known of
the insured's expectation; second, whether the insured
created or helped create these expectations; and third,
whether the insured's expectations are reasonable•
Id.

In examining

the above three factors, the court would also

evaluate "extrinsic matters such
the purpose
contract

as the

intent of

the parties,

sought to be accomplished, the subject matter of the

and

circumstances

surrounding

the

issuance

of

the

policy." Id., (citations omitted).
Plaintiff wishes
not cited

in any

argument made

of the

to point out that the Wagner case was
Briefs and

to the court.

was not

mentioned in oral

It is probable that the Wagner case
19

had not been decided when the

Trial

Court

defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
is important to the issues before

made

its

ruling on

Nevertheless, that case

this court

and should

not be

ignored.
In applying the three factors used in Wagner to resolve
the reasonable expectations concept,

the court

should carefully

examine the facts found in the deposition of Mr. Allen.
family purchased a trampoline, Mr. Allen called the
phone and

made arrangements

they could discuss changes
necessitated by

trampoline and

in

the

he was

wanted to

hurt on the trampoline would be
his own

coverages

very concerned

that were

about the

make sure that anyone who got

covered.

He intended

to cover

children for such injuries, and he thought he had family

coverage under the existing policy.
or should

At that time the

agent knew

have known that Mr. Allen expected the policy to cover

members of his family.
duty

policy

of a trampoline at the family home.

agent that

that he

agent on the

to meet him at a hamburger place so

an addition

Mr. Allen told the

When the

on

the

agent

The
to

trampoline circumstances

explain

to

Mr.

created a

Allen that the policy

contained an endorsement that excluded liability coverage for his
family.
he left

When the agent failed to make the necessary explanation
the

covered.

impression

with

Mr.

Allen

that

his

family was

Because of the agent's failure to meet his obligations

at that stage, the insured's expectations were reasonable.
When the concepts
applied to

the facts

announced

in

the

Wagner

case are

and circumstances now before the court, it
20

is obvious that material issues of

fact remain

to be determined

by the fact finder before the case can be resolved as a matter of
law.

Again, there is good

Dismissal entered

by the

reason to

set aside

Trial Court

the Judgment of

and to return the case to

the District Court for trial.
CONCLUSION
For reasons stated herein,
reverse the

Court should

Judgment of Dismissal entered by the Trial Court and

return the case to the lower
to trial

the Appellate

court with

instructions to proceed

on the factual issues relating to the Adhesion Contract

Theory.
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